From: Geoffrey Alan Rhodes (email suppressed)
Date: Tue Jun 10 2008 - 17:18:45 PDT
It is true that new technologies do not lend themselves to our
copyright system. For example, I have pasted below the introduction
from the Sage publication, New Media & Society-- something innocuous
and easily done, but I think illegal because it is not so closely
related to the criticism of this email and the selection long,
therefore not 'fair use'. Though we may like and find secure the
existing establishment for intellectual property, this may just be a
conservative desire. The future of arts and the artist, and ideas in
general, may be different economically from the past. Certainly it is
an uncomfortable situation for the artist, because in an age when the
action of copying is treated as stealing, it is clear that this can
only be achieved through alliances with power-- with the legal and
police system that designates and enforces what and who gets to have
things and at what price. I think, as has been pointed out, we are all
uncomfortable with supporting a system that has often stood in the way
of art practice (in the case of found footage and copyright, or the
much worse cases of procecuted trademark infringement, such as with the
Barbie trademark, and what was that film?), but afraid of the unknown
of a new economic system for art. But copyright in the information age
has become a bad law-- one of those laws where everyone is guilty of
breaking it, but enforcement is selective, meaning lobbied by those
with power.
--- INTRODUCTION Although it has not been used widely for more than a decade, the internet has shown an extraordinary capacity to spur the imagination of 403 © 2005 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. at YORK UNIVERSITY on June 10, 2008 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from academics, businesspeople and journalists alike. From the saviour of crumbling western economies to the vanguard of anarchist politic, the new medium has been ascribed almost every conceivable role. Leaning towards hyperbole rather than sober analysis, these accounts often defy any realistic conception of how media are used and what a medium can accomplish (Manovich, 2001). But obviously, the advent of the internet has not gone by without the introduction of any changes. Inexpensive written communication and easy information retrieval are just some of the most apparent examples. Maybe even more importantly, the production of qualitative content and its instant global distribution have become affordable to a considerably greater number of people. While this suggests that the internet has greater participatory capabilities than many other media, recurrent attempts to control its content and steer its data flows also have been made. The dynamics arising from this tension and the question of what effect it might have on society have been the subject of intensive debate in recent years. While it is too early to anticipate any specific outcome of these debates, studies in the emerging academic field of new media studies1 have succeeded in covering a wide range of phenomena emerging around the internet (Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2002). Reflecting on the theoretical trends of new media studies, Kim and Weaver (2002: 521) demand that ‘traditional mass communication theories should be redefined to effectively explain new communication technology and social system interactions’. Therefore, empirical research has to be accompanied by a development of theoretical tools, evolving both from theory’s relation to empirical material and a comparison of theories (Kim and Weaver, 2002). Calls for new theories and methods have been answered by a number of readers and anthologies, which examine the new technological situation from a wide range of epistemological and theoretical angles. As a whole, new media studies are characterized by an exceptional openness towards theory and method and up until now it seemed impossible to discern any obvious canon guiding research decisions in the field. This ‘ experimental approach towards theory and epistemology’ (Sterne, 1999: 264) allows for valuable interdisciplinary cross-fertilizations that hold the promise of a better understanding of evolving technological and social situations. However, it does not seem that the prevalence of this experimental approach in new media studies can be ascribed to any larger meta-theoretical decision or discussion. While there certainly is some overlap with the epistemological discussions of cultural studies and other academic traditions, much of the field’s experimental character seems to be attributable to enthusiasm in the face of the experimental possibilities of the new technologies themselves. New Media & Society 7(3) 404 © 2005 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. at YORK UNIVERSITY on June 10, 2008 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from Considering the quick progress of technological and financial consolidation in the new media sphere, these technologies’ experimental possibilities may not persist very much longer. In a climate that is generally more hostile towards such characteristics, the need for an ‘ experimental approach’ in academia also would appear less self-evident. The risk that new media studies’ valuable openness and social relevance will be compromised in such a scenario, therefore, has to be countered by the development of a more explicit meta-theoretical corpus. Unfortunately, empirical studies in the field of new media rarely discuss the theoretical underpinnings of their research more explicitly (Kim and Weaver, 2002), allowing their choice of theory to appear like a matter of personal disposition rather than critical assessment. However, along with the maturing of the field, histories of the field (Silver, 2000) as well as topical, theoretical and methodological meta- analyses have been developed (Kim and Weaver, 2002; Silver, 2004; Stempel and Stewart, 2000), pointing towards a need for more conceptual comparisons and evaluative analyses of the underlying theoretical approaches employed in the field. This study seeks to develop the move towards deepened meta-theoretical analysis. It is argued that, in order not to lose our grip amid the wealth of theoretical positions at play in the field, it is necessary to lift the discussion to a more abstract level and look at the underpinnings of theory rather than its applications. It is argued that, while wariness towards canon creation is justified, the renunciation of normative meta-theoretical criteria cannot be an option. On the contrary, the field’s flexibility, openness and relevance can be sustained only if its meta-theoretical premises are made explicit in a thorough debate. Taking the Frankfurt School scholarship as its main point of departure, this article argues that the issues of power, reason and closure should be made major areas of concern for such a debate. Three normative meta- theoretical criteria are suggested, drawing on Adorno and Horkheimer (1979[1944]), Birgitta H ̈oijer (1990), Horkheimer (1972[1937]) and Albrecht Wellmer (1991[1985]). Subsequently, these criteria are used in a critical review of some common theoretical perspectives at use in the field. For these reviews, texts have been chosen which employ a certain theory in a very explicit way. The point of these choices is not to criticize particular authors or reject whole theoretical traditions, but rather to show how some of the applied figures of thought, if allowed to have a decisive impact on a future canon, could narrow the scope of new media studies in unproductive ways. POWER Traditional theory, as described by Horkheimer (1972[1937]), hides its ideological nature within an aura of objectivism. It assumes that both the R ̈ohle: Power, reason, closure 405 © 2005 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. at YORK UNIVERSITY on June 10, 2008 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from individual scientist and the scientific process are autonomous from the surrounding society. Although ultimately it seeks the legitimacy of science in its usefulness for society, both its questions and epistemology are perceived to derive from within science. However, for critical theory the nature of its material cannot be taken for granted in any positivist fashion. As society is marked by struggle and contradictions, theory cannot avoid being influenced, if not determined, by these struggles: The critical theory of society . . . has for its object men as producers of their own historical way of life in its totality. The real situations which are the starting-point of science are not regarded simply as data to be verified and to be predicted according to the laws of probability. Every datum depends not on nature alone but also on the power man has over it. Objects, the kind of perception, the questions asked, and the meaning of the answers all bear witness to human activity and the degree of man’s power. (1972[1937]: 244) Thus, the question of power is at the heart of critical theory. Theory cannot be separated from ideology and from power relations in society. Therefore it seems vital that theory, rather than resting in ‘normality ’, should seek to identify and question the power relations which influence it and which, in turn, it is able to influence. Due to the importance of the question, this analysis should be given priority and should be attended to with utmost accuracy. Thus, the first meta-theoretical criterion is: 1. The theory should include a sophisticated concept of power that is as broad and subtle as possible and can be applied both analytically and self-reflexively. REASON Another difference between traditional and critical theory, according to Horkheimer, is that critical theory aims not merely at a coordinated gathering of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, but at ‘the rational organization of human activity’ (1972[1937]: 245), ultimately promoting ‘man’s emancipation from slavery’ (p. 246). However, Adorno and Horkheimer (1979[1944]) also discuss the problem of instrumental reason, promoting an excluding form of rationalization and functionalism. Berman (1983) and Bauman (1989) have traced some of the devastating consequences of this side of Enlightenment reason when incorporated into modernity. Postmodernism has intensified this critique, aiming to transcend the homogenizing effects of Enlightenment reason (Wellmer, 1991[1985]). Discussing the different aspects of the postmodern critique of reason, Wellmer summarizes: The linguistic critique of rationalism and subjectivism does provide an opportunity for thinking in new ways about ‘truth’, ‘justice’ or ‘ self- determination’; but at the same time it will make us suspicious of those who New Media & Society 7(3) 406 © 2005 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. at YORK UNIVERSITY on June 10, 2008 http://nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from want to give an affirmative twist, in the manner of Nietzsche, to the psychological critique of the subject – by which I mean those propagandists of a new era which shall have cast off the burden of Platonic heritage, and in which rhetoric shall replace argument, the will to power shall replace the will to truth, the art of words shall replace theory, and the economy of desire shall replace morality. We have quite enough of all that to contend with, after all, in the world as it is now. (1991[1985]: 70, emphasis in original) On the one hand, in Wellmer’s account a thorough critique of reason appears as necessary and adequate, considering the history of instrumental reason. On the other hand, reason is portrayed as one of the few viable tools which make normative statements possible. If it is reason that enables the combination of theory and political practice and provides both with a common direction, it is uncertain what happens if this principle is abandoned. Without a common, abstract principle on which to base one’s judgement, one truth could appear as valid as any other. Coherent politics or theory would hardly be feasible in such a scenario, as it would be impossible to predict the outcome of any action taken. According to Wellmer, an absolutist critique of reason has little to offer other than affirmation, regression or cynicism – traits that are impossible to build politics upon and therefore lend themselves to being smoothly integrated into capitalism. Wellmer (1991[1985]) argues, therefore, that it is necessary to narrow the focus of the critique of reason onto the relevant parts and perverted uses of reason, rather than abandoning the notion altogether. But he also states that politics in this sense cannot take the forms once promised by rationalist Enlightenment. Thus the second meta- theoretical criterion is: 2. A theory should incorporate a sensible critique of reason, including a discussion of alternative ways to maintain political impetus. R ̈ohle: Power, reason, closure __________________________________________________________________ For info on FrameWorks, contact Pip Chodorov at <email suppressed>.